We examine the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence by exploiting a natural experiment following interstate banking deregulation that increased bank competition. We find that bank earnings adjustment speed increases after the state where the bank locates implements the deregulation. This relationship is weakened, however, with the increase of banks' abilities to sustain earnings, as reflected in size, diversification, managerial efficiency and safety. We further find that compeititon directly impacts bank earnings adjustment speed, and does not indirectly go through the channel of earnings management.
Introduction
Financial crisis raises the recent intense debate on the association between accounting changes and financial crisis. For instance, the accusation of market value accounting after the 2007-2009 financial crisis, along with the economic significance of banks' liquidity and capital provision requirements, reveals the vital economic role of bank accounting (Beatty and Liao, 2014) . Bank earnings persistence plays an important role in maintaining the stability of the whole financial system and so has attracted growing debate on the factors that drive such a phenomenon (Cumming et al., 2012; Beaver et al., 2012; Gao and Zhang, 2015; Peterson et al., 2015; Hui et al, 2016; Buchner et al., 2016) .
According to economic competition theory, competition contributes to the mean reversion of market profitability (decreased earnings persistence) in the long term (Stigler, 1961; Mueller, 1977 Mueller, , 1986 Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011) . In other words, competition could erode away all excessive returns by attracting new entrants or all excessive losses by forcing the improvement of operations or exit of the market. Thus, competition could directly reduce earnings persistence. However, accounting studies implicitly suggest that earnings persistence is a result of earnings management (Sloan, 1993; Pope and Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011; Li, 2010; Healy et al., 2015) .
Few studies have attempted to reconcile the differences between theories that explain the main driving force of bank earnings persistence. It is possible that, as an effective external governance mechanism, competition could reduce earnings management via increasing the cost of mispricing (Graham et al., 2005; Dechow et al., 2010; Burks et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016) . Hence, the resulted reduced earnings persistence is the result of decreased earnings management caused by the increased competition. It is thus the central focus of this paper to determine whether the impact of competition on bank earnings persistence is directly or indirectly from earnings management.
We use a comprehensive data set of the US banking industry for the period between 1986 and 2013 and our final sample includes 15,546 unique commercial banks with 226,153 firm-year observations. The benefits of studying the banking industry are two-fold: First, our focus on a single homogenous industry removes the challenges of defining the market where a firm competes, thereby removing the potential bias in industry identification that is overly broadly or unduly narrowly defined. Second, the focus of analyzing the banking sector eliminates the concern on conglomerates that operate in different industries and thus face competitions in different markets.
We use a partial adjustment model to capture bank earnings adjustment speed, which allows earnings targets to be bank-specific and to vary over time (see, also, Healy et al., 2014; Flannery and Rangan, 2006; De Jonghe and Öztekin., 2015) . Earnings adjustment speed refers to the speed at which banks adjust earnings to their target ROA, and equals one minus earnings persistence. Thus, faster adjustment speeds indicate lower earnings persistence. We estimate heterogeneous adjustment speeds via a two-stage procedure. In the first stage, we obtain a constant adjustment speed λ for each bank and estimate the target ROA for each bank-year. In the second stage, we use the gap between the target ROA and the observed realized ROA to obtain a time-varying adjustment speed for each bank in each year.
We exploit the cross-state, time-varying variation in the removal of interstate bank branching prohibitions to identify an exogenous increase in bank competition. The introduction of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) in 1994 by the US authorities relaxed geographical restrictions to bank expansion across state borders. This relaxation enhances competition by enabling banks to enter into new markets in other states, thereby allowing them to compete with those banks in the local market (DeYoung, 2010; Rice and Strahan, 2010, among others) .
We start by investigating whether banks adjust their earnings with a faster speed in those states that implement the IBBEA and deregulate interstate banking within their borders to a great extent. We find that an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index, which indicates an increase in bank competition, leads to an increase in bank earnings adjustment speed. This finding is in line with the prediction of the economic theory that competition reduces earnings persistence (Stigler, 1961) . We also find that banks with higher earnings management, which is measured as Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions, tend to have slower earnings adjustment speed. This finding is in line with the arguments in the extant accounting literature.
Our findings hold after controlling for state and time fixed effects, a wide array of time-varying bank characteristics, such as size, risk, capital-asset ratio, efficiency, and macroeconomic conditions, such as GDP growth, inflation and GDP per capita in each state.
We conduct a host of robustness tests to ensure that our findings are not driven by potential biases in the sample or alternative explanations. In our additional cross-sectional analysis, we find that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is reduced with the increase of banks' abilities to sustain earnings, including size, diversification, managerial efficiency and safety.
Next, we investigate whether the positive impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed goes through an indirect earnings management channel. If this were true, we should expect to find a negative impact of competition on bank earnings management, because a higher level of competition would result in lower earnings management, which will then lead to higher earnings adjustment speed. The extant literature, however, does not provide a widely accepted direction on the relationship between firm competition and earnings management. The researchers who advocate a negative relationship argue that competition acts as an external governance mechanism, which prevents managerial slack and protects the interest of shareholders (Dechow et al., 2010) , and that competition increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing earnings management incentives (Graham et al., 2005) .
On the other hand, if the positive impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed does not go through the earnings management channel, we expect to find a nonnegative (positive or insignificant) impact of competition on bank earnings management.
This will then be consistent with another strand of the literature which argues that increased competition puts higher pressure on managers and hence, induces managers' unethical behaviors such as earnings management, giving rise to an empirically observed positive relation between competition and earnings management (Shleifer, 2004; Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997; Milgrom and Roberts, 1992; Bagnoli and Watts, 2010; Tomy, 2016; Dou et al., 2016) .
To answer this question, we conduct two analyses to examine whether competition exerts a positive impact on bank earnings management by using two bank earnings management frameworks. First, we use discretionary loan loss provisions, which is widely used to measure earnings management in the banking industry (see, e.g., Beatty et al., 2002; Cohen et al., 2014; Cornett et al., 2009; Cheng and Warfield, 2005; Beatty and Liao, 2014) .
We indeed find a positive relation between competition and discretionary loan loss provisions. Thus, our evidence does not support the argument that the impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed goes indirectly through the channel of earnings management.
Second, we consider the possibility that banks may use securities available for sale to smooth earnings, as suggested by the recent findings of Barth et al. (2015) , and Dong and Zhang (2015) . Available for Sale (AFS) securities is the largest category of banks' securities that comprise a sizable proportion of bank assets (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010) . It is less costly to conduct earnings management via realizing gains and losses on AFS securities than via managing accruals or by involving in real activities because sales of securities are not subject to ex post scrutiny by professional institutions such as auditors.
This advantage may therefore enables banks to continuously manage earnings despite facing competition. If this is true, regardless of whether competition is strong or weak, banks can manage AFS to achieve the purpose of earnings management via. Our evidence supports this argument, and again suggests that competition directly impacts bank earnings persistence, rather than indirectly going through the channel of earnings management. This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, to our best knowledge, we are the first to document the causal relation between competition and earnings persistence by employing Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act as an exogenous shock. Prior studies tend to ignore the endogeneity with respect to the causal relation between competition and earnings persistence Gropp and Kashyap, 2010; Goddard et al., 2011) . Recently, Healy et al. (2014) recognize that it is difficult to attribute causality between competition and earnings persistence, given many channels that drive competitive forces, such as government regulation. Our study fills this gap by employing a government regulation change as an exogenous shock that impacts bank competition.
Second, we examine whether the competition law affects banks with different size, level of diversification, management efficiency, and level of default risk. We find that the stronger a bank is in its ability to sustain earnings, as reflected by having a large size, better diversification, higher managerial efficiency and lower default risk, the lower is the impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed. Third, we provide evidence that the effect of competition on bank earnings persistence is direct, but not indirectly through the channel of earnings management.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents conceptual framework.
In Section 3, we describe our identification strategy, sample construction, instruments, models and summary statistics. Section 4 presents and discusses our main results and Section 5 conducts two additional analyses. Section 6 concludes.
Conceptual framework
Economic scholars argue that competition directly impacts earnings persistence, where competition could erode away all economic excessive returns and losses in the long run and thus, the market profitability level will converge toward a long-term equilibrium (Stigler, 1961; Mueller, 1977 Mueller, , 1986 Berger et al., 2000; Goddard et al., 2011) . More specifically, the excessive profit currently possessed by a firm attracts new competitors to enter the market by offering similar or same product with lower prices, leading to decreases in the profit margin. This process will not stop until firms' profitability reaches the average profit rate of the market. For firms with the profits under the market average will receive precaution from investors to reach the market average level in a short time. Otherwise, investors will withdraw their investment, resulting in the exit of the underperforming firms from the market. Thus, competition directly reduces earnings persistence.
On the other hand, there is a widely accepted consensus that earnings persistence is a result of earnings management choice or earnings manipulation (Sloan, 1993; Pope and Wang, 2005; Chen, 2010; Dechow et al., 2010; Skinner and Soltes, 2011) . The underpinning rationale is that, with information asymmetry between managers and investors, firms smooth earnings for purposes like taxes minimization, dividend payouts, target achievements, hiding poor economic performance or avoidance of covenants (Guay et al., 1996; Arya et al., 1998; Burgstahler et al., 2006) . Managers are also motivated to smooth reported earnings overtime to obtain relatively constant compensation (Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995; Healy, 1985; Warfield et al., 1995; Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006) . For instance, managers might manipulate earnings downward when bonuses have already reached maximum levels, and might manipulate earnings upward when the actual earnings are not qualified for a bonus plan. Subjecting to regulatory capital requirements, banks with lower regulatory capital are motivated to increase it. Consequently, banks might manipulate earnings to accomplish that objective (Barth et al., 2015) .
Data and variables

Data
To explore the impact of competition and earnings management on earnings persistence, we combine data from several sources. From Federal Reserve Report of Condition and Income (Call Reports), we obtain the data of balance sheets and income statements at the commercial bank level, rather than their bank holding company levels. We exclude from our sample foreign banks and banks with total assets less than one million US dollars. Macroeconomic information is from World Bank database. Finally, our full sample includes 15,546 banks with a total of 226,153 firm-year observations from 51 states over the period of 1986-2013.
The identification strategy of bank competition
Prior studies use different measures, such as country survey index, the HerfindahlHirschman Index, and the Lerner Index, to measure competition at the country, industry, firm or product level (Healy et al., 2014; Goddard et al., 2011; Berger et al., 2000) . These measures, however, cannot address the endogeneity issues between competition and earnings persistence because unobservable cross-sectional heterogeneity could impact both competition and earnings persistence. On the other hand, reverse causality may also exist. For example, persistent earnings of the industry may indicate better business operations, continuous profits, increasing stock prices and lower debt costs (Lin et al., 2013) and hence, can attract new competitor entrants. Alternatively, persistent earnings of the firm may increase the capability of existing firms in preventing new entrants into the market, resulting in less competition. This Act allows states to erect barriers to branch expansion. However, some states make use of this provision by prohibiting out-of-state banks from opening or acquiring branches, by requiring the minimum age of bank branches that could be acquired, or by mandating the maximum amount of deposits that banks could hold. Therefore, IBBEA increases banks' competition in each state while the magnitude of increased competition in each estate is different. Following Rice and Strahan (2010), we create a variable called:
'Geographic Expansion Index', which decreases with the extent of interstate branching deregulation restrictions in a state. Hence, an increase in the Geographic Expansion Index indicates an increase in bank competition.
It is important to note that interstate bank deregulation is exogenous to bank earnings persistence. There is no empirical evidence to show that banks' earnings persistence affects the timing of deregulation. Thus, the interstate bank deregulation Act tends to be a disordered act that provides a valuable research laboratory for assessing the influence of competition on banks' earnings persistence. There are also extensive studies applying IBBEA as an exogenous shock to bank competition on topics of firm financing (Rice and Strahan, 2010), firm innovation (Cornaggia et al., 2015; Amore et al., 2013) , bank liquidity (Shenoy and Williams, 2015) and market valuation of bank holding companies (Goetz et al., 2013) , among others. 
Earnings management measure: Discretionary loan loss provision model
where Sizeit is the natural logarithm of total assets, ΔLoan Charge-offsit represents the difference in total loan charge-offs between periods t and t-1, ΔLoansit represents the difference in total loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit reflects the change in non-performing loans between periods t and t-1, ΔNon-performing Loansit-1 reflects the change in non-performing loans between periods t-1 and t-2, and ΔNon-performing Loansit+1 represents the change in non-performing loans between periods t+1 and t. All the variables except Size in Equation (1) are deflated by the book value of total assets of each bank.
Earnings adjustment speed: The partial adjustment model
A number of studies use a first-order autoregressive model to capture the dynamics of firm's earnings (Mueller, 1990; Jenny and Weber, 1990) . This model can only produce a time-invariant persistence level for each entity. However, the persistence level of each entity in every year may not remain unchanged. In order to improve the estimation accuracy, several studies adopt partial adjustment model to obtain time-varying persistence level for each entity (Healey et al., 2014; Gropp and Heider, 2010; Memmel and Raupach, 2010; De Jonghe and Öztehin, 2015) . We follow these studies and employ the partial adjustment model to estimate the dynamic persistence level for each bank in each year.
In the partial adjustment model, the bank's current return level (ROA) is a weighted average of its target and its previous year's ROA:
where ROAit is the return on total assets of bank i in year t. ROA*it is the target ROA of bank i in year t. λi represents the proportional adjustment for bank i. In our context, λi captures the exw a bank operates away from its target ROA. Alternatively, ROA is predicted to mean revert to a target level, ROA*. Therefore, bank earnings adjustment speed refers to the speed at which banks' earnings adjust to their target ROA and equals 1 minus earnings persistence.
The ROA* can be determined by a cross-sectional model:
where Xit is a vector of the bank and macroeconomic characteristics influencing ROA.
Substituting Equation (3) into Equation (2) and rearranging yields Equation (4) below:
Equation (4) shows that in the partial adjustment model, the bank's current ROA is a weighted average (with λi between 0 and 1) of ROA in its previous period, the unobserved fixed effects and random shocks. If the value of λi is small, the adjustment speed is slow,
suggesting that it takes a long time for a bank to reach its target ROA after a shock to its ROA. On the other hand, known as an inertial fact in the partial adjustment model, (1-λi)
represents the earnings persistence level. The smaller value of adjustment speed indicates a higher level of earnings persistence. When (1 -λi) equals 1, the adjustment speed equals 0, indicating that the earnings level is unchanged. In contrast, when (1 -λi) equals 0, the adjustment speed equals 1, suggesting that there is no earnings persistence because the speed of adjustment to the target ROA is instant.
In the partial adjustment model, the target ROA (ROA*) is unobservable and is not necessarily constant over periods. Therefore, we employ the cross-sectional model proposed
by Fama and French (2006) 
where Income Diversification is the non-interest income to total revenue ratio, the variable of Non-performing Loans is the non-performing loans to total asset ratio, Revenue is total revenue to total asset ratio and the Capital Ratio is total equity to total assets ratio, Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Management Efficiency is calculated via total costs divided by total revenues, and Loans is the total net loans over total assets. We employee The above model for estimating the target ROA uses contemporaneous variables, for which Healy et al. (2014) demonstrate to be sufficient to predict the target ROA. The adjustments are meaningful if there is a difference between the target ROA and the actual ROA. The GAP is applied to define the difference between these two variables:
To test what determines the dynamic of bank earnings adjustment speed. We modify the empirical setup described in Equation (2) and adjust the model such that the adjustment speed, λ, can vary over time and banks:
λit= λi+ Zit-1
We assume that λit is dynamic and varies across banks and over time. is a vector of coefficients for the adjustment speed function and Zit-1 is a vector of the bank and macroeconomic characteristics that could affect adjustment speed. Substituting Equation (7) into Equation (2) yields the specification for a partial adjustment model with dynamic adjustment speed λit, that is heterogeneous:
We follow Healy et al, (2014) and Flannery and Rangan (2006) to estimate Equation (8) in two steps. In the first step, we use Fama-Macbeth regression for Equation (4) and obtain an estimate of target ROA (i.e., ROAit*) (see, also, Fama and French, 2006; Healy et al, 2014) . Then, we use Equation (6) to calculate the earnings GAP for each bank in each year. In the second stage analysis, we follow De Jonghe and Öztekin (2015) and use OLS with bank and year fixed effects. Heterogeneity robust standard errors are clustered at bank level (for robustness, we also conducted several alternative clustering methods and our conclusions are not changed). Having running regression as in Equation (8), we obtain a set of coefficients . These coefficients allow us to directly test how bank's competition and earnings management influence earnings adjustment speed. The sign of reflects the relationship between Z and the adjustment speed. Table 3 presents the regression results of Equation (4) <Insert Table 3 here> We standardize all the explanatory variables in the regression, except for Geographic Expansion Index because this index is an ordinal variable rather than a continuous variable.
Summary statistics
The impact of Interstate banking deregulation on earnings adjustment speed
The coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is positive and significant. Since a higher Geographic Expansion Index value indicates higher competition, a positive regression coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index indicates that banks in more competitive markets tend to adjust their earnings at a higher speed. As shown in Column (1) of Table 4 , a one inter-quartile increase of Geographic Expansion Index leads to an increase of earnings adjustment speed by 9.4%. This result is in accordance with economic competition theory that competition impacts earnings persistence by eroding away economic excessive returns and losses in the long run (Stigler, 1961) .
In Column (2) of Table 4 , the coefficient of Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions is negative and significant, suggesting that banks with higher earnings management tend to have a slow earnings adjustment speed. Earnings adjustment speed will decrease by 4.8%
(0.178*0.27) if Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions rises by one standard deviation. This result also supports the widely documented opinion that the principle purpose of earnings management is to smooth earnings (Healy and Wahlen, 1999; Dechow et al., 2010; Gaver et al., 1995; Holthausen et al., 1995) . In addition, we find that the coefficients of Capital Ratio are significant and positive, indicating that banks with higher capital ratio adjust earnings faster. Size shows a significantly negative impact on the adjustment speed, suggesting that larger banks tend to have more persistent earnings than their smaller counterparts. A one standard deviation increase in Size decreases the adjustment speed by 0.324% (0.054*0.06).
Managerial Efficiency is also significantly and positively related to earnings adjustment speed.
We conduct further analysis to examine whether the positive impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is driven by those banks with earnings below their target (positive GAP), because these banks tend to have more incentives to adjust their earnings to their target levels than their better performed peer banks. We re-run the regressions on the subsample of banks with positive and negative GAP, respectively. The results are reported in Column (4) and (5) of Table 4 . We find that the coefficients on Geographic Expansion index remain positive and significant in both specifications. It suggests that our main results are not driven by those banks with earnings below their target (positive GAP), and competition consistently erodes away the economic excessive returns (GAP<0) and expel losses (GAP>0) (Stigler, 1961) .
<Insert Table 4 here>
Robustness analyses
We also conduct additional tests to ensure that our results presented in Table 4 are not driven by potential biases in the sample or due to alternative explanations. Table 5 reports the results.
First, there exists a potential concern that our results may be driven by states that time their interstate bank branching deregulations to coincide with a higher level of bank earnings persistence. Thus, the positive coefficient estimates on Geographic Expansion Index in the previous regressions may simply reflect a trend of rising adjustment speed after the IBBEA deregulation. To address this concern, we further conduct the following empirical analysis.
We follow Krishnan et al. (2014) , and introduce the Before (4,1) dummy variable, which equals one for the years t-4 to t-1 preceding the deregulation year t. This variable captures the difference in earnings adjustment speed of banks in each state between the four-year period t-4 to t-1 prior to the deregulation year t and the years prior to the four-year period, t-5 and earlier, before the deregulation. If the deregulations are due to states trying to time earnings persistence or if our results above represent a secular trend in earnings persistence, the coefficient estimate on Before (4,1) dummy should be positive and statistically significant. We do not find such evidence. In Column (1) of Furthermore, these results also indicate that reverse causality does not drive our results.
Third, in order to examine the influence of deregulation over a long time horizon, we expand our sample for the main regression of Equation (8) to the time period of 1986 to 2013. As shown in Column (3) of Table 5 , the coefficient is significantly positive, which is the same as and consistent with those reported in Table 4 . Fourth, we consider the potential bias by banks operating in multiple states. Thus, we restrict our sample to those banks with only one branch and banks with size below USD 100 million, respectively. The results reported in column (4) and (5) are consistent with our main findings. IBBEA 1994, we repeat our main regression analysis using the sub-sample before year 1999 and find consistent results reported in Column (6). Sixth, we use standard errors that are clustered at the bank, state and state-year level. The coefficients of Geographic Expansion Index across column (7) to column (9) continue to be statistically significant at 1% level.
Finally, as reported in Table 5B , we conduct a robustness test using event differencein-difference strategy following Bertrand and Mullianathan (2003) , and Chemmanur, He and Nandy (2010) to further test whether our main results are sensitive to different methods. This method captures the dynamic variation of the difference between the treatment and control groups around a particular event. It could also prevent us from producing underestimated small standard errors by including a too long sample period in a difference-in-difference estimation (Bertrand et al. 2004) 
where GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 -ROAit-1, Before t (After t ) is a dummy variable equal to 1 for t years before (after) the introduction of deregulation of a state. For example, Before 5 equals 1 for year 5 before a particular state's deregulation introduction year, and 0 otherwise. We find that the coefficients on After 1 , After 2 , After 3 , After 4 are all positive and statistically significant. This result shows that after the introduction of deregulation, banks accelerate earnings adjustment speed. This effect is most pronounced 2 and 3 years after the introduction year. These results are consistent with our main results.
<Insert Table 5A here>   <Insert Table 5B here> 
The effect of banks' heterogeneous ability to sustain earnings on earnings persistence
In the previous sections we have established causality between competition and bank earnings adjustment speed. In this subsection, we attempt to strengthen the interpretation of this relation by exploring the impact of banks' heterogenous abilities in sustaining earnings, which affects their earnings adjustment speed. The hypothesis is that the impact of competition on bank earnings adjustment speed should be less strong for banks with higher level of ability to sustain their previous years' earnings.
Specifically, we expect that banks with larger size, higher level of diversification, more efficient in management and lower level of default risk have stronger ability to sustain earnings. A large bank size usually indicates comprehensive strength, which may help banks increase their earnings persistence. Product diversification reflects banks' business expansion, which increases banks' attractiveness to customers (De Young and Rice (2004) and Stiroh and Rumble (2006) ). Further, income diversification effectively reduces earnings volatility caused by a particular external event. Banks' safety and soundness could reduce banks' default risk induced by external shocks. Efficient bank management not only reduces operation costs but also makes timely and effective strategies to mitigate loss caused by external changes or is even able to find opportunities in external crises (Lin and Zhang, 2010; Shehzad et al., 2010) .
In the empirical analysis, we introduce four variables, size, diversification, managerial efficiency, and Z-score, and their interaction terms with the Geographic Expansion Index. <Insert Table 6 here>
The impact of competition on earnings management
In the previous sections we document a positive impact of bank competition and a negative impact of bank earnings management on bank earnings adjustment speed. Our findings emphasize that the impact of bank competition on earnings adjustment speed is direct and causal. However, the accounting literature emphasizes the role of earnings management in shaping the relation between competition and earnings persistence (Li, 2010; Healy et al., 2014) .
This argument implicitly suggests that competition may indirectly impact earnings persistence through the channel of earnings management because an increased competition could lead to lower level of earnings management. The reasoning is that competition increases the cost of misreporting, thereby curbing the incentives of earnings management.
With more competitive rivals, firms are more likely to lose their shareholders, customers and suppliers due to the damage of reputation caused by misreporting (Graham et al., 2005) .
Consequently, it is possible that competition reduces earnings management and that such a reduced earnings management results in a lower level of earnings persistence, or equivalently speaking, a higher speed of earnings adjustment, as we found in. We investigate whether this indirect channel may exist and drive our main results by using two earnings management models in this section.
The impact of competition on Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions (DLLP)
In this subsection we examine the direct impact of bank competition on bank earnings management, as measured by discretionary loan loss provisions. If it is indeed that bank competition impact on earnings persistence indirectly through the earnings management channel, we would expect a negative relationship between the Geographic Expansion Index and our bank earnings management measure, otherwise the impact of competition on earnings adjustment speed would not be positive. e.g., Graham et al., 2005; Lin et al., 2016; Burks et al., 2016; Jiang et al., 2016) .
We further examine whether the impact of bank competition on earnings management is driven by banks with earnings above their targets (GAP<0), because these outperforming banks have more incentives to manipulate earnings to avoid sudden drops in earnings. We thus re-run the regressions with two sub-samples of banks with earnings below (GAP>0) and above (GAP<0) their target, respectively. Column (2) and (3) of Table 7 report the results. We find that the coefficient of Geographic Expansion Index is significantly positive only in the GAP<0 regression but not in the GAP>0 regression. These results indicate that the impact of bank competition on earnings management is driven by banks that have higher ROA than their targets (GAP<0).
<Insert Table 7 here>
The impact of competition on bank earnings management through Available for Sale Securities (AFS securities)
Prior research documents that banks tend to use the item of available for sale (AFS) securities to smooth earnings (Barth et al., 2017; Dong and Zhang, 2015) . AFS securities is the largest category of banks' securities and contains a sizable proportion of bank assets (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010) . Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 320 specifies that AFS securities should be measured as fair value in the statement of financial position, with changes in fair value recognized in other comprehensive income. Hence, the accounting treatment for gains and losses from AFS securities provides banks a chance to engage in earnings management by selling these securities and realizing selected gains and losses. After the announcement of Accounting Standard Codification (ASC) 320, it is increasingly popular that banks use AFS securities to manage earnings due to large size of this item and lower cost of managing this item (Nissim and Penman, 2007; Laux and Leuz, 2010) .
In this Section, we examine whether competition induces earnings smoothing via utilizing the AFS securities. Following Barth et al. (2017) and Dong and Zhang (2015), we use realized gains and losses of AFS securities model to capture bank earnings management.
We estimate the following model: 
where AFS securitiesit is realized gains and losses on AFS securities and Net Incomeit is net income before taxes and gains and losses on AFS securities, both deflated by beginning-ofyear total assets. Competitionit is the Geographic Expansion Index. If banks employ AFS securities to maintain persistent earnings, the coefficient on Net Incomeit, 1 , should be negative, and if banks under more competition realize more gains from AFS securities, the coefficient on Competitionit, 2 , should be positive. Our interested coefficient is 3 , the interaction term between Net Incomeit and Competitionit.. It tests whether earnings smoothing is more pronounced for banks under higher competition. A negative 3 implies that competition would directly intensify banks earnings smoothing behavior.
2
The results are reported in Table 8 . In column (1), net income before tax is negatively related to realized gains and losses of AFS securities. This finding suggests that banks use AFS securities to smooth earnings, which is consistent with Barth et al. (2017) . The interaction term of Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income is insignificant, indicating that bank competition does not induce more earnings smoothing by utilizing AFS securities.
Column (2) and (3) consistently show insignificant coefficients on the interaction term of 2 It is worth to note that the model of Barth et al., (2017) only allows us to check whether banks use AFS securities to smooth earnings, but not the magnitude of this earnings management.
Geographic Expansion Index and Net Income when we consider the sub-samples when GAP >0 and GAP<0, respectively. These results further confirm our main findings that bank competition has a direct rather than indirect impact on bank earnings persistence through the channel of earnings management.
<Insert Table 8 here>
Conclusions
In this study we investigate whether competition directly affects bank earnings persistence or indirectly go through the channel of earnings management. We employ a sample of commercial banks in the U.S. from 1986 to 2013. We use the introduction of the Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act (IBBEA) as a natural experiment of competition, which could effectively mitigate endogeneity issues in prior research. By applying a two-stage partial adjustment model, we find a negative impact of competition on earnings persistence, consistent with economic competition theory that competition directly impacts earnings persistence. O the other hand, we do not find a negative relation between competition and earnings management, although we find a positive relation between earnings management and persistence. Therefore, our evidence rules out the possibility that competition could indirectly decrease earnings persistence through the channel of earnings management.
Our findings are useful for scholars and practitioners, who seek to understand bank earnings persistence. The implication for policy makers is to pay attention to form a healthy competition environment for existing banks while at the same time encourage information disclosure quality. As a result, investors could obtain more valuable information regarding banks performance and the banking industry could become more stable, contributing to the stability of the financial system. Table 1 Panel A Summary Statistics This table reports the summary statistics for banks during the period of five years before and five years after the year when the IBBEA act was introduced in each state. ROA* is estimated using the first stage of the partial adjustment model, ROAit =λi iXit-1 + (1-λi) ROAit-1+ it, GAPit=ROA*it-1-ROAit-1. ΔROA= ROAit-ROAit-1. We use Fama-Macbeth regression to estimate the ROA* in the first stage. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. This table presents the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit -ROAit-1 = ( λi + γZit-1 ) GAPit-1 + it ,GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 -ROAit-1) over the ten-year period in which no more than five years are distant from the IBBEA introduction year. Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions are the proxy for earnings management across all columns. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.
(1) We assume λi to be dynamic, so it varies across banks and over time. Z is a vector of all independent variables. This table presents the placebo tests of the OLS results for parameter estimates on Z in the Partial Adjustment Model: (ROAit -ROAit-1 = ( λi +γZit-1)GAPit-1 + it, GAPit-1 = ROA*it-1 -ROAit-1). Column (1) shows the results controlling for the four years prior to the deregulation year. Before (4, 1) is a dummy variable equals one for year -4 to -1 relative to the deregulation year. Columns (2) displays the results under which Geographic Expansion Index variable is the actual index for one year prior to the actual deregulation. Column (3) displays the regression results for both large banks and their smaller counterparts. Column (4) presents the regression results using the full sample. Column (5) to (7) present the regression results using the sub samples, while (8) to (10) show regression results using different standard errors clustering method. t-statistics are in parentheses. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables. 
Table 7 The Impact of Competition on Bank Earnings Management
This table presents the OLS results between competition and earnings management with the full sample, and when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0). The dependent variable, earnings management, is measured by Discretionary Loan Loss Provisions. As to independent variable, competition is measured by Geographic Expansion Index. *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5% and 1% significance levels, respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.
(1) 
Table 8 The Impact of Competition on Bank Realized gains/losses of AFS
This table investigates whether competition induces banks earnings management using realized gains/losses of available for sale securities, when the bank is above or below its ROA target (GAP<0 or GAP>0). The dependent variable is Realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. NI is net income before tax and realized gains/losses of AFS scaled by total assets. The Geographic Expansion Index measure is a state level competition measure. All other variables are defined in the appendix. *, **, *** represents the significance level of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Appendix presents the definitions of variables.
